Trophy hunting and conservation: Do the major ethical theories converge in opposition to trophy hunting?

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1 INTRODUCTION

Trophy hunting has been at the centre of controversies in conservation for at least two decades (Leader-Williams et al., 2001; McComb et al., 2001). Debates about the ethics of trophy hunting intensified after July 2015, when an American dentist killed Cecil, the lion, in Zimbabwe, in what was perceived by the public as an inhumane manner (Actman, 2016; Macdonald, Jacobsen, et al., 2016). A series of published debates among conservation scholars followed the public outrage arguing both in favour and against trophy hunting (Di Minin et al., 2016; Macdonald, Johnson, et al., 2016; Nelson et al., 2016; Ripple et al., 2016).

Trophy hunting denotes a type of selective recreational hunting of nonhuman animals (hereafter, animals) done to obtain their body parts as a representation of success or memorial (Pospisil, 2017). As its definition implies, trophy hunting can be distinguished from other forms of hunting that are done for survival, subsistence or cultural purposes. Moreover, although there might be some components of...
physical activity and skill practicing involved, recreation or sport is not focal to trophy hunting, since the ultimate aim in trophy hunting is obtaining a trophy (i.e. a sign of victory, reward and success). In this essay, I refer to trophy hunting as it is practiced by the Western world and claimed to promote conservation.

As a conservation tool, trophy hunting has been debated by both the public and experts. Although most contentions have been around ecological and management issues in trophy hunting, the controversy also has roots in ethical considerations regarding killing animals for recreation and trophies (Dobson, 2012; Nelson et al., 2016). Ethics plays a fundamental role in justifying conservation activities (Minteer & Miller, 2011) so that some scholars consider conservation as an ethically driven science (e.g. Saltz et al., 2018; Soulé, 1985). Thus, conservation practitioners must contemplate ethical concerns regarding both humans and animals in conservation policy (Vucetich et al., 2018; Vucetich & Nelson, 2013).

2 | TOWARDS ETHICAL CONVERGENCE IN TROPHY HUNTING POLICY

In environmental ethics, the congruence between moral values and principles on one side, and their policy implications, on the other hand, has been an issue of concern. At the level of moral values and principles, the main agenda is why an action is right or wrong, while at the level of policy, the question is what ought to be done. On practical grounds, these two levels of environmental concern do not always come into agreement. That is, a single moral value or principle may not adequately address policy since, depending on the context, an action may impose environmental problems on multiple levels, in various scales and concerning differential moral value.

To reconcile such issues from a pragmatist perspective, Bryan Norton (1991) suggests a distinction between ‘consensus’ and ‘convergence’ in environmental ethics. While consensus implies a full agreement between the levels of moral principle and policy, convergence denotes agreement at the level of policy (i.e. what ought to be done) despite underlying disagreement in moral principle (i.e. why a particular action is right or wrong). In his ‘convergence hypothesis’, Norton (1991) argues that at the policy level, the implications of environmental holism and anthropocentrism converge, even though proponents of holism have commonly argued that anthropocentrism is not a sound basis for an environmental ethic.

The conservation literature has sparsely addressed ethical considerations of trophy hunting (e.g. Batavia et al., 2018; Gunn, 2001; Macdonald, Johnson, et al., 2016; Morris, 2020; Nelson et al., 2016). These publications often adopted a single ethical framework to investigate the ethics of trophy hunting, whether utilitarian (Gunn, 2001; Macdonald, Johnson, et al., 2016), deontological (Ahmad, 2016; Nelson et al., 2016) or virtue ethics (Batavia et al., 2018); and came to different conclusions in favour of or opposition to trophy hunting. It appears that such disagreements are rooted in differential moral values, various geographical or ecological scales and diverse perspectives that each ethical view adds to the issue. Hence, an ethical analysis that broadly incorporates various ethical concerns may better inform trophy hunting policy. Motivated by this aim, this essay discusses ethical concerns about trophy hunting, considering three major frameworks in normative ethics—that is, utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics. I will argue that, considering a sufficiently broad range of ethical concerns, all the three ethical frameworks can converge at the level of policy in opposition to trophy hunting.

3 | UTILITARIANISM

In philosophical ethics, utilitarianism refers to the view that right actions and practices maximize the aggregated happiness of all those affected by them (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2019). Obviously, this does not mean acting so as to maximize one’s own happiness (which is a common misconception). Indeed, a utilitarian stance necessitates considering all consequences of an action on all those affected. Hence, in trophy hunting, the interests of affected animals and humans ought to be accounted for in the aggregate welfare. In fact, utilitarian moral philosophers (e.g. Singer, 1975) have been at the forefront of advocating for the consideration of animals’ interests and welfare in our decisions. Even Jeremy Bentham, the father of modern utilitarianism, suggested that the capacity for suffering entitles animals to equal consideration of moral interests (Bentham, 1780/1948).

There are two major lines of thought on how to apply the utilitarian principle. Act utilitarians believe that the principle of utility should be applied on a case by case basis and to individual actions. In contrast, rule utilitarians use the principle of utility to select sets of rules governing various general types of actions and/or social practices (Nathanson, n.d.). Opponents of act utilitarianism argue that it can lead us to wrong answers. For instance, act utilitarianism may justify killing one person and using the organs to save five people in need of life-saving transplants. Also, critics of act utilitarianism claim that it can undermine trust among people. For instance, if doctors can kill one person to save five, no one will be able to trust the health system. Rule utilitarians argue that good rules would prevent such practices and generate more good effects than making utilitarian judgments on individual cases, particularly at the societal level (Harsanyi, 1985; Nathanson, n.d.).

Given such widely acknowledged problems with act utilitarian reasoning, and given that my concern in this paper is with the practice of trophy hunting as a type of activity that is rule-governed (by laws or policy documents), in this section, I consider trophy hunting from a rule utilitarian perspective. First, I briefly outline the utilitarian arguments for trophy hunting. Then, I discuss some of the practice’s negative consequences that are often ignored in utilitarian arguments in favour of trophy hunting. Compared to deontology and virtue theory, utilitarianism relies more on empirical facts (i.e. what are the actual circumstances and consequences of an action for all sentient beings involved). Thus, this section on utilitarianism will be longer than the sections on deontology and virtue theory.
3.1 | Utilitarian arguments for trophy hunting

The majority of arguments in favour of trophy hunting highlight the economic benefits of trophy hunting for conservation and local communities. They rest on the utilitarian rationale of providing benefits for animal (and human) populations by sacrificing some individual animals’ lives (e.g. Gunn, 2001; Macdonald, Johnson, et al., 2016). Such arguments rest on the premise that trophy hunting’s harmful biological and socio-economic consequences can be minimized or avoided (e.g. Dickman et al., 2019; Lindsey, Frank, et al., 2007), and that trophy hunting creates net economic benefits and conservation incentives (e.g. Gunn, 2001; Naidoo et al., 2016). For instance, Gunn (2001) argued that trophy hunting provides monetary incentives for local communities to protect wildlife, and integrates conservation and development. Macdonald, Johnson, et al. (2016) claimed that a utilitarian view endorses properly regulated trophy hunting since its gain for biodiversity outweighs the loss of individual animals.

Those in favour of trophy hunting also refer to some cases where trophy hunting provides benefits for conservation and local communities (e.g. communal conservancies in Namibia or private wildlife lands in Zimbabwe; see IUCN, 2016). For example, in a study of communal conservancies in Namibia, a simulated ban on trophy hunting reduced the number of conservancies that could cover their operating costs (Naidoo et al., 2016). Others have suggested that well-regulated hunting frameworks and effective governance could minimize trophy hunting’s negative impacts on wildlife populations and bring benefits to local communities (Begg et al., 2018; Lindsey, Frank, et al., 2007).

3.2 | Problematic consequences of trophy hunting

Despite the purported examples, some evidence from the literature suggests that the negative impacts of trophy hunting cannot be avoided entirely, and some negative impacts are often neglected in the utilitarian arguments. While scrutinizing individual trophy hunting cases is beyond the scope of this essay, based on this evidence, I contend that a more thorough inclusion of trophy hunting’s consequences in utilitarian evaluations is required.

Here I review evidence from the literature that undermines the benefits associated with the practice of trophy hunting. To provide a framework for elaborating on the biological and socio-economic concerns about trophy hunting, I borrow the IUCN guiding principles on trophy hunting (IUCN, 2012). The IUCN guidelines provide a structure to analyse trophy hunting consequences thoroughly. These consequences can have adverse effects on the happiness of present or future animals or humans.

3.2.1 | Biological effects

The IUCN guidelines (IUCN, 2012) require that trophy hunting should not contribute to long-term population declines and not substantially alter natural selection and ecosystem functioning. Moreover, trophy hunting activities should not modify ecosystems in a way that diminishes native biodiversity. Assessing each of these consequences goes beyond this essay’s scope. However, some of the following results from the literature question whether current trophy hunting practice avoids biological costs.

Adverse consequences of trophy hunting on endangered species populations are among issues that have been addressed in the literature. In advanced social mammals (e.g. elephants and whales), removing older individuals with usually higher trophy values may cause severe population declines due to the loss of social knowledge, which is necessary for survival (McComb et al., 2001). Moreover, Packer et al. (2011) showed that in rural Tanzania, lion and leopard populations have higher rates of decline in areas with trophy hunting compared to those without. In the case of lions, there have been concerns about increasing infanticides and population decline due to replacements of the dominant males caused by selective hunting (Kiffner, 2008; Packer et al., 2009; Whitman et al., 2004). Evidence also cautions about the possible detrimental effect of trophy hunting on endangered species populations through supply-and-demand mechanisms, rarity and increasing value for trophy species (Palazy et al., 2011, 2012). Furthermore, poor management and ineffective policies in trophy hunting have been shown to contribute to the decline of endangered species (e.g. lions, Creel et al., 2016; Lindsey et al., 2013; and snow leopards, Rashid et al., 2020) and that of other iconic species (e.g. see Cruise, 2016).

Trophy hunting can also negatively influence biodiversity and ecosystem functioning through wildlife farming and captive breeding of trophy species (i.e. trophy breeding). Notably, in some cases, selective breeding of more valuable species or removing predators to protect trophy-valued large herbivores distorted the functioning and structure of wildlife communities on private lands (Luxmoore & Swanson, 1992; Ripple et al., 2016). Some evidence also suggested that introducing non-native herbivore (Castley et al., 2001) and carnivore species (e.g. tigers; Snijders, 2018), game protective fencing (Woodroffe et al., 2014) and removing predators to protect trophy animals (Pirie et al., 2017), all in response to trophy hunting demand, have deteriorated local biodiversity. Moreover, fuelled by rising auction prices, captive breeding of trophy animals affected biodiversity by having evolutionary consequences such as inbreeding in animal populations (Castley et al., 2001) and artificially creating ‘new species’ through hybridization, splitting and crossbreeding (e.g. golden gnus; Snijders, 2018).

In addition, selective removal of individuals based on phenotypic characteristics can result in adverse evolutionary consequences for populations and species (Festa-Bianchet, 2003). Coltman et al. (2003) showed that hunting bighorn trophy rams based on their heritable traits (specifically body and horn size) results in smaller-horned, lighter rams and fewer trophies in North America. Similar effects have been observed on impalas, greater kudus and sable antelopes in Africa (Crosmany et al., 2013; Muposhi et al., 2016), as well as Cape buffalo and elephants (Muposhi et al., 2016). Additionally, skewed sex ratios and age structures due to selective harvesting of
large mammals may cause rapid evolution, in addition to other adverse evolutionary outcomes (Aryal et al., 2015; Mysterud, 2011).

3.2.2 | Socio-economic effects

The IUCN guidelines (IUCN, 2012) outline that, as a conservation tool, trophy hunting should create equitable net conservation benefits for local human communities co-existing with wildlife populations. Furthermore, there should be social and cultural benefits associated with trophy hunting based on accountable and effective governance and adaptive management. These interventions should respect local cultural values and practices, and the benefits should be distributed transparently, free of corruption (IUCN, 2012).

Precise and reliable estimates of trophy hunting’s contribution to the African countries’ economies are hard to find, and the existing evidence is limited and contested. One often quoted figure is based on Lindsey, Roulet, et al. (2007) estimate of $200 million in annual contributions by trophy hunting to the economy of sub-Saharan Africa, of which $100 million belonged to South Africa solely. The accuracy of such figures has been questioned (Campbell, 2013). Also, some reports showed that trophy hunting, on average, accounted for only 1.8% of the total annual revenue from tourism (equal to 0.004% of GDP) in nine major sub-Saharan African countries (Campbell, 2013; also see UNWTO, 2014). Another study found that while trophy hunting was responsible for $132 million in annual income and generated 7,500–15,500 related jobs in Botswana, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe; this trophy hunting revenue accounted for less than 0.78% of income and 0.76% of jobs generated by the tourism sector in those countries (Murray, 2017).

Furthermore, a report by the IUCN West and Central African Protected Areas Program found insignificant economic contributions from big game hunting to the local economies, especially compared to the size of the areas dedicated to trophy hunting (IUCN/PACO, 2009). This report demonstrated that the total number of 15,000 trophy hunting-related jobs generated in Africa is insignificant, again considering that the population of the eight primary big game hunting countries was 150 million people with a vast area of their land (16.5%) dedicated to hunting.

Another concern regarding the socio-economic impacts of trophy hunting is that of corruption and inequitable distribution of benefits (Leader-Williams et al., 2009). Studies have revealed that, in some cases, local communities’ share in trophy hunting revenues is minimal and reduced by corruption (Baldus & Cauldwell, 2004; Campbell, 2013; Dube, 2019; Grijalva, 2016; Lindsey, 2008; Nelson et al., 2013; Nordbe et al., 2018; Sachedina, 2008). For instance, a report from Tanzania estimated that only 3% of the trophy hunting revenue goes to community development (Booth, 2010), while the majority goes to other beneficiaries such as tourism facilities, airlines, hunting operators, governments and other individuals. Similarly, in Northern Cameroon, between 2000 and 2008, the local communities’ share from the total trophy hunting revenue equalled only 2.6%, and that only a small proportion of the villagers benefited (Yasuda, 2011). Furthermore, according to the IUCN report (IUCN/PACO, 2009), in the 10 big game hunting countries (excluding South Africa), the average turnover of big game hunting equalled to $US1.1/ha, out of which only $US0.10/ha went to the local communities. This report concludes that this minimal share for local communities may explain their lack of interest in preserving hunting areas and their continued encroachment and poaching (IUCN/PACO, 2009).

Finally, research has revealed social inequalities emerging as consequences of trophy and game hunting, for instance, in South Africa (e.g. see Andrew et al., 2013; Brandt, 2013; Cruise, 2016; Pasmans & Hebinc, 2017), Namibia (e.g. see Koot, 2019), and Cameroon (e.g. see Yasuda, 2011). Land conversions to game farms, mainly justified by the economic benefits of hunting, have displaced farm workers in South Africa, which threatens the historically developed links between farm dwellers (primarily black workers) and farms (Brandt & Spierenburg, 2014). In a similar vein, Joseffson (2014) claims that such conversions contribute to the colonial presence and hinder social transformation in the rural landscape in favour of landowners, who inherited land as the apartheid legacy in South Africa. Lastly, trophy hunting has been identified as a reconfiguration process that enables game farmers to assert their authority on the land over the black population (Brandt, 2016).

3.3 | The rule utilitarian case against trophy hunting

Based on the reviewed evidence, it seems that the benefits that trophy hunting proponents point out are inflated and not equitably distributed. Moreover, those favouring trophy hunting often ignore or underestimate some of trophy hunting’s negative consequences in the utilitarian equation. Regarding the negative consequences, two additional concerns are noteworthy. Animal welfare considerations (when understood in terms of the feelings of sentient animals; see Jones, 2013; Morris, 2020; Sekar & Shiller, 2020) need to be accounted for, particularly in cases where trophy animals suffer from a painful death, as well as instances where culling an animal causes a feeling of grief in its conspecifics (see Flynn, 2019).

Additionally, resentment among the human public raised by trophy hunting (e.g. Macdonald, Jacobsen, et al., 2016; Nelson et al., 2016) merits consideration as a negative outcome in an utilitarian analysis of trophy hunting. The public reaction to adverse events in trophy hunting (such as the case of Cecil, the lion) is a crucial concern that must be considered when assessing the consequences of trophy hunting policy. These consequences can undermine public trust in conservation. Consequently, the public backlash can lead to outcomes that have a negative impact on conservation, such as reducing individuals’ willingness to contribute to conservation or losing their support for conservation policies (López-Bao et al., 2017; Wilson, 2008).

Considering the various, often overlooked costs associated with it, I believe that a rule utilitarian should generally oppose the practice of trophy hunting. I do believe, however, that a rule utilitarian
approach could endorse the practice if various specific rules were effectively enforced: (a) trophy hunting must not jeopardize wildlife populations, alter natural selection and ecosystem functioning, or diminish native biodiversity; (b) trophy hunting must create equitable net conservation benefits to the local community that are not available through alternative ethical practices; (c) trophy hunting must not contribute to social inequality and injustice; (d) trophy hunting must consider animal welfare and minimize sentient animals’ suffering and (e) trophy hunting must not cause public outrage and undermine public trust in conservation. Such rules warrant the consideration of all trophy hunting consequences to all who are affected, and following them can assure meeting the utilitarian principle of maximizing happiness for all. However, complying with all these rules seems formidable and makes the morality of trophy hunting questionable as a general practice.

4 | DEONTOLOGY

In philosophical ethics, deontology refers to a family of moral theories that hold what makes actions or practices moral is their conformance to certain rules or duties, or respect for individual rights (Alexander & Moore, 2007). This principle contrasts with utilitarianism that emphasizes the effects on aggregate happiness. Deontologists argue some things should never be permitted, even if doing them does bring about the best consequences. Thus, they treat certain rules or individual rights as ‘trump cards’ against utilitarian considerations.

In ethics, various deontological formulations exist, and some ethicists have applied them to analyse hunting, in general, and often rejected its morality (with some exceptions like subsistence or traditional indigenous hunting; e.g. Donaldson & Kymlicka, 2013; Taylor, 1986). These philosophers have discussed hunting, but they tend to distinguish between hunting for food and hunting for ‘sport’. For instance, Taylor (1986) argued that both ‘basic’ and ‘non-basic’ interests of humans (e.g. respectively: for food, and for literature or art) can justify violations of the ‘basic’ interests of nonhumans, as long as the humans involved express an appropriate attitude of ‘respect for nature’ (see pp. 179–186 and 274–276). By those criteria, true subsistence hunting can be justified, but not trophy hunting. In another work, Ahmad (2016) stated that trophy hunting had only been discussed from the utilitarian ethical perspective. He rejected utilitarianism and explained that since animals and the environment have intrinsic values, it is our duty to protect them, without expecting incentives or benefits. Ahmad’s perspective on trophy hunting mirrors what the premier animal rights philosopher, Tom Regan (2004), says about utilitarian justifications for hunting to control wildlife populations. Regan argues that if we take seriously the view that individual animals have rights that block utilitarian justifications for harming them, then we cannot justify killing certain animals on the grounds that the consequences will be better on the whole (e.g. if large-scale starvation due to habitat degradation can be prevented by culling).²

A deontological ethical framework focuses our attention on the rules or duties, and/or respect for individual animal rights. Authors approaching the subject of hunting, in general, from deontological perspectives have tended to denounce it, even when used for wildlife population control; thus, taking a deontological approach does not promise to support trophy hunting specifically.

5 | VIRTUE ETHICS

Virtue theory primarily focuses on character rather than on actions and consequences (as in utilitarianism), or rights and rules (as in deontology) (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2003). Although the moral virtues have traditionally been conceived of as character traits that are acquired through practice rather than being innate, virtue theorists have defined them variously as (a) making their possessor more likely to do the morally right thing, or (b) contributing to living a flourishing human life.³ For this paper, I assume a version of the second approach to defining the virtues, that is, moral virtue is a character trait that contributes to living a flourishing human life (Hursthouse, 1997). Also, I assume that a flourishing human life involves developing and maintaining good relationships both with other human beings in civil society and with the animals and natural environments on which human civilizations depend (Hursthouse, 2009).

Although hunting, in general, has been defended from a virtue theoretical perspective, these analyses have not defended trophy hunting, specifically. For instance, Jensen (2001) depicts hunting as an activity linking humans to the wilderness and natural environments. He claims that this link can bring educational value, especially for young adults, and can cultivate environmental virtues of humility, connectedness, gratitude and respect, at least in some hunters. However, he clearly excludes trophy hunting from his defense of hunting (Jensen, 2001). Similarly, Cahoon (2009) outlines three virtues of hunting, two of which are related to raising your own produce and the relationship with what a hunter eats as food, neither of which relate to trophy hunting. The third virtue that he describes involves hunters’ knowledge of local ecology, which resembles Jensen’s claim of the connection with nature. Such a view has also been supported by Leopold (1968) and some other scholars (e.g. List, 2013).

While some of the existing virtue theory arguments have been made in favour of sport hunting and not particularly trophy hunting, a practical way of evaluating trophy hunting as a means of cultivating virtue is to explore the motivations and intentions of trophy hunters (Slote, 2001). Given the controversies around trophy hunting, it is surprising that there are only a few scientific studies exploring trophy hunters’ motives and intentions. This is despite the fact that such studies are more common regarding sport hunters. In one early study, Kalof and Fitzgerald (2003) visually analysed a sample of 792 dead animal or animal body part images from 14 hunting magazines in the United States. Their analysis revealed extreme objectification of animal bodies, marginalization of animals and their bodies and clear patterns of a
show-off display and victory over a worthy opponent in the pictures of trophy hunters with their dead trophies (Kalof & Fitzgerald, 2003).

Furthermore, Child and Darimont (2015) analysed 2,791 online hunting photographs looking for signals of emotion and satisfaction in hunters’ smiles. Their analysis revealed that trophy hunters’ satisfaction was achievement-oriented, which increased by large versus small prey, with versus without prey and carnivore versus herbivore prey (Child & Darimont, 2015). Another piece of literature, again based on observations of social media, argued that trophy hunting is a signalling behaviour involving show-off and display, amplified by social media, to achieve social status and prestige (Darimont et al., 2017).

As the studies above imply, whether trophy hunters’ motivations and intentions associate with nurturing and practicing the kinds of virtues that contribute to living a flourishing human life is dubious. It appears that the motives of trophy hunters are barely in compliance with the environmental virtues enumerated earlier in this section. Moreover, the current practice of trophy hunting seems to be more dependent on economic resources and technology possessed by the hunter rather than personal skills or efforts that might be related to virtues (see Simon, 2016, 2017). Nevertheless, there might be some relations between trophy hunting and connectedness with nature and place, which require further investigation. It is noteworthy that the mentioned virtues of humility, connectedness to nature, gratitude and respect for nature and animals can also be attained through other non-conservative nature-based activities, such as hiking and nature photography (Duffus & Dearden, 1990). As Lovering (2006) replied to Jensen (2001), the moral standing of animals casts doubt on the morality of hunting them and all the virtues expressed thereby.

Another way of looking at trophy hunting from a virtue ethics perspective is through vices and assessing whether trophy hunting engages its agent in any actions that are linked with undesirable character traits. Sandler (2017) enumerates maleficence towards nonhuman living things, cruelty towards animals and lack of compassion for them among the environmental vices. Research on vices like cruelty towards animals shows that they entail adverse effects, not only to animals, but also to human character development, behaviour and social life (Hodges, 2008; Kavanagh et al., 2013; Levitt et al., 2016; Lockwood & Ascione, 1998). In a similar vein, links have been found between lacking empathy for animals and lacking empathy for humans (Taylor & Signal, 2005).

To know precisely what virtues and vices are associated with the contemporary practice of trophy hunting requires further empirical research. However, in addition to the few studies mentioned above, there are cases such as Cecil the lion (Howard, 2015), or canned hunting (i.e. breeding animals in captivity and releasing them in enclosures for trophy hunting; Barkham, 2013; Ireland, 2002), that reveal the extent of violence and cruelty to animals involved in them. Indeed, roots of the public outrage against trophy hunting after events like the hunting of Cecil or the recent case of Skye (an iconic male lion from the Kruger National Park) might be found in the violence and brutality involved in those actions (see Actman, 2016; Louw & Pickover, 2018; Malone, 2018; Nelson et al., 2016).

As reviewed here, through a virtue ethics framework, there seems not to be an association between trophy hunting and trophy hunters’ virtues and human flourishing. In contrast, studies done on the motivations and intentions of trophy hunters suggest that some vices are involved in it. Therefore, trophy hunting appears to be ethically problematic under a virtue ethics framework.

6 | CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Ethical convergence in trophy hunting policy

The review of the evidence presented in this essay suggests that under a utilitarian framework, it is doubtful whether the benefits of trophy hunting significantly outweigh the costs to the animals, biodiversity, ecosystems and concerned people. There appear to be empirical flaws about how likely it is that trophy hunting leads to essential benefits to conservation while avoiding costs. In many cases, local communities’ share of the financial benefits is minimal, uncertain and not equitably distributed, while losses to the animals and biodiversity are certain and real, and so is the public resentment and diminished trust. This is why I concluded that under a utilitarian framework, trophy hunting can be ethically permitted only if the practice is regulated so as to ensure that it: (a) does not jeopardize wildlife populations, alter natural selection and ecosystem functioning or diminish native biodiversity; (b) creates equitable net conservation benefits to the local community that are not available through alternative ethical practices; (c) does not contribute to social inequality and injustice; (d) considers animal welfare and minimizes sentient animals’ suffering and (e) does not cause public outrage and undermine public trust in conservation.

In any case, the burden of proof is on trophy hunting advocates to show that these rules are followed to assure maximizing utility to all affected. Scientifically sound data on biological and socioeconomic consequences of trophy hunting should be provided for a comprehensive ethical judgment of trophy hunting under the utilitarian framework (Macdonald et al., 2017; Treves et al., 2018). Of chief importance is studying trophy hunting consequences at the social level (Koot, 2019). The available evidence is conflicting and casts doubt on the utilitarian assumptions that trophy hunting is often based on. Moreover, a comprehensive utilitarian ethical assessment of trophy hunting should include animal welfare (e.g. Morris, 2020; Sekar & Shiller, 2020) and public outrage (e.g. Hampton & Teh-White, 2019) in the negative consequences of the practice.

All in all, there seems to be convincing evidence suggesting that, in practice, many trophy hunting cases do not obey the utilitarian rules to maximize utility. The current trophy hunting practice has not only violated these rules in many cases, but it has resulted in practices such as canned hunting and wildlife farming, which are ethically problematic. Even regarding the cases that are often mentioned as successful trophy hunting examples, there is evidence revealing their noncompliance with the utilitarian rules (e.g. CAMPFIRE
in Zimbabwe, see Dube, 2019; or communal conservancies in Namibia, see Hannis, 2016; Koot, 2019).

Furthermore, as reviewed in this essay, a deontological framework does not seem to support trophy hunting, at least until such ethical arguments are proposed. Additionally, under a virtue ethics framework, trophy hunting does not prove to contribute to the virtues and human flourishing of trophy hunters. Yet, studies done on the motivations and intentions of trophy hunters suggest that some vices are involved in it.

A broad consideration of ethically relevant issues in trophy hunting goes beyond mere economic benefits. It comprises all consequences of the practice, including societal impacts and animal welfare, in addition to economic and biological outcomes. Furthermore, a comprehensive ethical evaluation of trophy hunting respects the rights of animals to live and rules that prevent unnecessary harm to them, as well as the character and motivations of trophy hunters.

Thus, the review of ethical concerns provided in this essay suggests that, when a sufficiently broad range of ethical concerns is considered, the practice of trophy hunting looks to be ethically problematic from all three ethical frameworks. Taking an approach analogous to Norton’s convergence hypothesis (1991), utilitarian, deontological and virtue ethic principles all converge at the level of policy; hence, the opponents have ethical reasons to oppose trophy hunting.

6.2 | Practical implications

If the practice is going to continue, conservation authorities and managers need to reconsider underlying assumptions of trophy hunting and address the practical and ethical concerns mentioned in this essay. Of high priority are those cases in the trophy hunting industry that cause the most ethical concerns (e.g. canned hunting and wildlife farming).

To address ethical concerns under a virtue ethics framework, further social studies need to be conducted on the trophy hunting industry and trophy hunters’ motivations and behaviour. Meanwhile, it is the responsibility of conservationists to stop the propagation of vices in the trophy hunting industry (this is also an ethical concern from a utilitarian perspective to reduce the subsequent public outcry and discomfort with the practice).

Wherever, in the name of conservation and population control, trophy hunters express violence or cruelty in removing animals besides the ecological intentions, this practice could become ethically unacceptable and cause public outrage. Consider an analogy to capital punishment. In some countries, execution is considered an acceptable punishment for certain crimes. There were individuals who would pay to enjoy performing the executions and the money raised could be spent on humanitarian efforts. Would selling execution permits promote good character development, tend to contribute to aggregate happiness, or be allowed by any sets of deontological rules?

It is not the aim of this essay to propose alternatives, nonetheless, conservation policymakers are encouraged to seek substitute sources of funding (e.g. see Gallo-Cajiao et al., 2018 for a discussion of ‘crowdfunding’ for conservation) and ethically acceptable conservation practices to replace trophy hunting. For example, as an alternative to killing the animals, trophy hunters could dart and sedate them, take their photos, and acquire trophies by 3D-printing of the animals’ casts or replicas. In this way, trophy hunters can obtain their trophies and, at the same time, conservation can benefit through, for instance, GPS tagging the animals (see Cove, 2018 for details). Also, in cases where trophy hunting is being conducted for population control purposes, non-lethal ways of population control, such as pharmacological methods (Palmer et al., 2018; Singer, 1997), should be preferred, wherever feasible.

6.3 | A vision of the future

Ethical issues are complicated, and there is no easy, straightforward answer for morally contentious topics. Even what is considered ethical in one era might prove not to be ethical in the future (e.g. slavery). Trophy hunting was hardly a topic of moral questioning in the past; however, the situation has been changing. Research shows that public value orientations and attitudes have gradually turned against domination and mastery views over wildlife to more mutualistic and animal-welfarist ones (e.g. Manfredo et al., 2009, 2020), driven by forces of modernization (Manfredo et al., 2016, 2020). Indeed, the recent decline in the number of hunters and hunting activities in North America (e.g. see Price Tack et al., 2018) might be a symptom of such ongoing value shifts. These fundamental changes have clear implications for conservation practices. That is, the old conservation methods should be altered to accommodate new public values and demands (e.g. see Bruskotter et al., 2017; van Eeden et al., 2017).

It is not unreasonable to speculate that increasing social pressure and shifts in public attitudes will result in condemnation and restriction of trophy hunting activities in the foreseeable future. Conservationists are invited to pioneer in realizing and embracing this change in society. As moral agents, it is upon us to take a side on the trophy hunting debate now that will be considered ethical and humane in the future as history will judge.

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The author declares no conflict of interest.

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This manuscript does not include any data.

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ENDNOTES

1 A common criticism of utilitarianism is that its focus on maximizing aggregate happiness ignores concerns about equity in the distribution of benefits. However, utilitarians going back to Bentham (1780/1948) have responded that the phenomenon of ‘diminishing marginal utility’ justifies them in embracing some principle of equity in the distribution of benefits.

2 However, Varner (1998, 2011) argues that Regan’s ‘miniride principle,’ in some cases, would implicitly endorse hunting individual animals for the sake of animal populations or ecosystem functioning. In a nutshell, the ‘miniride principle’ dictates that when all individual rights are equal, saving more lives by sacrificing few lives is moral and obligatory. Thus, hunting is permitted in the cases where the number of natural deaths caused by overhunting the carrying capacity would be more than the number of lives that would be taken by humans to prevent overpopulation.

3 Both definitions are implicit in Aristotle’s foundational treatment of the virtues Aristotle (n.d./1985), although subsequent authors have sometimes focused on one or the other. For instance, a classic criticism of Aristotle is that he gives viciously circular definitions of virtue and right actions, and Hursthouse (1997) defines the virtues in terms of human flourishing.

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